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Nations of the world are currently negotiating a 
variety of significant trade and investment treaties 
that cover upwards of eighty percent of the world 
economy. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 
would further integrate a number of Pacific-Rim 
nations; the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) would be a treaty between 
the United States and European countries. The 
United States and others are also negotiating major 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with China and 
India.  
As the negotiations have progressed, the 
investment provisions of these treaties have become 
increasingly controversial—though they are not well 
understood.  This short policy brief highlights three 
core concerns about the investment provisions in 
contemporary treaties that have received significant 
scrutiny in scholarly and policy circles. These 
provisions go well beyond conventional notions of 
“free trade” and tend to:
•	 grant foreign investors greater rights than host 
country governments and citizens;
•	 use procedures that give special access to 
foreign corporations; and
•	 lack an independent impact on levels of 
investment in the economies of treaty 
signatories.
Given these aspects of investment treaties, host 
countries may be surrendering a considerable 
amount of policy sovereignty that is needed to boost 
economic growth and protect the public welfare—
without being compensated for such losses through 
increases in foreign investment and economic 
growth. 
Fortunately, policy-makers and the broader public 
have come to recognize that non-trade issues such 
as investment now form the core of most trade and 
investment treaties. The aim of this policy brief is to 
highlight the hazards created by this change and 
present options for reform so as to contribute to a 
discussion of how trade and investment treaties can 
ensure both economic prosperity and responsible 
governance.
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in only a “significant” or “substantial” adverse 
economic effect. 
In the widely-cited Metalclad v. Mexico award,2 
for example, the tribunal held that under 
NAFTA’s expropriation provision an investment 
in a hazardous waste facility was indirectly 
expropriated by the decisions by municipal and 
state governments to deny a construction permit 
for the facility and designate the affected area as 
an ecological preserve. The tribunal indicated that 
the international standard for indirect expropriation 
covered not only seizures of property but also 
“incidental interference with the use of property 
which has the effect of depriving the owner, in whole 
or in significant part, of the use or reasonably-to-be-
expected economic benefit of property even if not 
necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host State.”3
In addition, the treaty standard for indirect 
expropriation covers a scope of “investment” 
that is much broader that the rights related to 
real estate that are protected under regulatory 
expropriation doctrines in some countries’ domestic 
law. The 2012 U.S. Model BIT is illustrative, defining 
investment to include “every asset that an investor 
owns or controls, directly or indirectly, that has 
the characteristics of an investment, including  . . . 
the commitment of capital or other resources, the 
expectation of gain or profit, or the assumption of 
risk.”4  
The broad scope of covered investment has 
encouraged investors to bring indirect expropriation 
claims based on a wide range of regulatory 
measures. Pending disputes include challenges by 
Philip Morris to cigarette labeling laws in Uruguay 
and Australia arguing that the labeling restrictions 
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“These treaties contain 
language granting 
foreign investors greater 
rights than those 
typically enjoyed by 
citizens under domestic 
law. ”
Granting Greater Rights to Foreign Investors
 The U.S. Congress and European Parliament 
have taken the position that trade and investment 
treaties should protect foreign investors from 
discrimination without providing them with greater 
rights than citizens. The substantive standards of 
protection in these agreements, however, go far 
beyond prohibiting discrimination against foreign 
investors.  In addition to nondiscrimination rules 
(known as “national treatment” and “most favored 
nation”), these treaties contain language granting 
foreign investors greater rights than those typically 
enjoyed by citizens under domestic law. The most 
significant sources of these rights are contained in 
provisions on “indirect expropriation” and “fair and 
equitable treatment” (FET). Moreover, there are 
few and limited safeguards that allow countries to 
deviate from these provisions in order to protect the 
public welfare.
Indirect expropriation
The domestic law of most countries requires the 
government to compensate property owners when 
property is seized or “expropriated” for public use. 
The law of some countries—including the United 
States—also under certain limited circumstances 
requires governments to compensate property 
owners when they regulate property in a manner 
that has an economic effect comparable to 
expropriation.  Most countries, however, do not 
require compensation based on the adverse impacts 
of regulations. Virtually all regulations have a 
negative economic impact on someone and, if 
compensation was required for all such impacts, 
many regulations would simply be too costly to 
implement.
yet the expropriation provisions of trade and 
investment treaties explicitly apply to both “direct” 
and “indirect” (i.e. regulatory) expropriation. The 
right to compensation for regulatory measures 
under these treaties has been interpreted more 
expansively than the comparable right in countries 
that recognize regulatory expropriations.1  Under U.S. 
law, for example,  a regulation typically must cause 
the complete or near-complete destruction of the 
value of property in order to constitute a regulatory 
expropriation.   In contrast, investment tribunals 
have required compensation when a measure results 
have indirectly expropriated their intellectual 
property rights5  and a claim by a U.S. company 
arguing that Quebec expropriated its oil and gas 
exploration permit through its moratorium on 
hydraulic fracking for natural gas.6  Even if these 
claims are all dismissed, governments always face 
the risk of losing new challenges based on similar 
arguments, at a potentially severe and unavoidable 
financial cost, due to the ad hoc nature of the 
arbitration process.
Fair and equitable treatment 
The fair and equitable treatment (FET) provisions of 
trade and investment treaties are the most common 
grounds for successful claims by foreign investors 
and provide even more extensive rights that the 
language on indirect expropriation. Investment 
tribunals have indicated that FET encompasses an 
“evolving” and therefore expanding set of rights.  
Tribunals have interpreted FET to include a right 
to a “stable and predictable legal environment,” 
which enables foreign investors to challenge 
changes in regulatory standards that adversely 
affect their “legitimate expectations” about the 
value or profitability of their investments. As the U.S. 
State Department has acknowledged, there is no 
comparable right to compensation under U.S. law.7 
Tribunals have also interpreted FET to include a 
variety of tests that allow tribunals to second-guess 
government policy decisions. In the recent Bilcon 
case against Canada, for example, the tribunal 
indicated that FET can be violated by conduct a 
tribunal considers to be “unjust,” “unfair,” or reflecting 
a “manifest failure of natural justice….” 8 Applying 
this standard, the Bilcon tribunal concluded that 
Canada violated FET by rejecting a proposed basalt 
quarry and marine terminal in Nova Scotia following 
an assessment of its social and environmental 
impacts. Domestic law standards of review for 
economic regulations are typically much more 
deferential to the authority of governments to 
regulate economic activity and do not permit courts 
to substitute their judgment for that of governments 
concerning the fairness of regulatory measures. In 
Bilcon, the foreign investor was able to avoid such 
standards of review by bringing a claim directly 
before an investment tribunal without seeking 
judicial review in Canadian courts.
Weak exceptions and safeguards
The substantive standards of protection in 
investment treaties come with limited safeguards 
that do not adequately protect governments’ 
ability to regulate to protect the public interest. 
For example, U.S. investment treaties permit 
countries to insulate certain types of measures from 
challenge under some foreign investor rights, but 
this mechanism does not apply to expropriation or 
FET,9 which have been the bases for most successful 
investor claims.  
A key concern is that recent treaties lack a 
safeguard for preventing and mitigating financial 
instability. Some treaties include an exception 
for prudential measures, but it is available only in 
narrow circumstances and often includes circular 
or self-canceling language that greatly reduces its 
effectiveness. Moreover, no U.S. treaty since the 1994 
North American Free Trade Agreement has included 
even a qualified balance-of-payments exception 
that allows countries to take emergency measures to 
stem a financial crisis.10
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“ Tribunals have interpreted 
FET to include a right to a 
‘stable and predictable legal 
environment,’ which enables 
foreign investors to challenge 
changes in regulatory 
standards that adversely affect 
their ‘legitimate expectations’ 
about the value or profitability 
of their investments.”
Unbalanced Dispute Resolution System
 
In the World Trade organization, countries 
resolve disputes with each other before 
state-to-state dispute settlement panels. 
In contemporary trade and investment treaties, 
a large part of the dispute settlement process is 
governed by foreign investors in a process called 
“Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS).”  Scholars 
and policy-makers have raised at least five major 
concerns with ISDS as proposed in the Trans-
Pacific Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership and, potentially, in future 
U.S. and European investment treaties with China.
1. ISDS shifts key powers to for-profit arbitrators 
who are not publicly-accountable or judicially 
independent.11  Whenever foreign investors 
choose to bring a claim, the arbitrators are given 
the power to make final decisions about what 
a country can do in its sovereign legislative, 
executive, and judicial capacity. They can also 
assign vast amounts of public funds to foreign 
investors. They are subject to very limited or no 
judicial review, depending on the rules under 
which the foreign investor chooses to bring its 
claim.
2. ISDS does not satisfy basic standards of judicial 
independence and fair process.12  For example, 
it does not allow state or local governments, 
or domestic investors, a right of standing in 
the process alongside the foreign investors, 
even if they have a direct interest, such as a 
reputational interest, in the dispute. Further, 
ISDS uses a for-profit process of arbitration 
in which conventional safeguards of judicial 
independence are absent, with little or no 
judicial supervision. Due to the existence of 
confidential ISDS cases, conflicts of interest 
in the arbitration process – arising from the 
common practice of arbitrators working on 
the side as ISDS lawyers – cannot be policed 
effectively by the parties or anyone else, 
even under those treaties that allow for more 
openness in ISDS. 
3. ISDS gives foreign investors a range of benefits 
that are not available to domestic investors and 
citizens.13 As a result, it reconfigures a country’s 
institutions in favor of foreign investors and 
against anyone with conflicting interests. For 
example, only foreign investors can bring an 
ISDS claim to protect their assets, broadly 
defined. Because of the high cost of ISDS, the 
primary financial beneficiaries have been large 
companies and very wealthy individuals. ISDS 
lets them bring international claims against 
countries without having to go first to the courts 
that protect everyone else. 
4. ISDS poses significant risks to democratic 
accountability and regulatory flexibility.14  ISDS 
disciplines are unique as a basis for litigation 
risk of governments because they lead to an 
uncapped order of compensation against the 
nation. Even if a claim is brought and lost by a 
foreign investor, or threatened but not initiated, 
the ability to bring an ISDS claim is a unique 
lobbying tool. 
 
To illustrate, in November of 2014, the Canadian 
Council of Chief Executives warned Canada’s 
federal government that Canada would face 
ISDS claims if the government proceeded 
with new anti-corruption rules.15  It will be 
very difficult if not impossible to assess the 
impacts of these threats because they relate to 
decision-making and possible negotiations off 
the public record. yet, the warnings illustrate 
the bargaining option that ISDS gives to 
major companies. Table 1 provides a few other 
illustrative cases, among hundreds of known 
ISDS arbitrations, where private firms have 
filed claims against host country regulations 
for financial stability, public welfare, and 
environmental protection.
5. If ISDS is included in a small number of proposed 
trade and investment treaties, the role of ISDS 
would expand massively. For example, as 
measured by the amount of FDI flows to which 
it would apply, the TTIP is far more significant 
than all of the thousands of existing investment 
treaties combined. The TTIP will cover about 
50-60% of all investment flows in and out of the 
U.S.; about 15-20% of those flows are covered 
by existing treaties.16  A few other treaties—
especially the TPP, an EU-China investment 
treaty, and a U.S.-China investment treaty—
would expand ISDS coverage to over 80% of the 
investment flows.
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Economic Benefits are Limited
 
There is limited evidence that trade and 
investment rules have an independent 
impact on attracting new investment flows to host 
governments.  What is more, econometric evidence 
is even more limited regarding the extent to which 
foreign investment spurs economic growth when it 
does flow to host country economies.
A number of studies have examined the extent 
to which trade and investment treaties have 
an independent impact on attracting foreign 
investment to host nations. The majority of these 
studies have found weak or nonexistent correlations 
between treaties and attracting investment flows.17 
The foreign investment that does result from 
opening up an economy does not necessarily have 
the desired impacts of economic growth and well-
being. olivier Jeanne, Arvind Subramanian, and John 
Williamson at the Peterson Institute for International 
Economics conducted a sweeping ‘‘meta-regression’’ 
of the entire literature that includes 2,340 regression 
results and found little correlation between opening 
up to foreign investment and economic growth. The 
authors concluded: “the international community 
should not seek to promote totally free trade in 
assets—even over the long run—because (as we 
show in this book) free capital mobility seems to 
have little benefit in terms of long run growth.18”  
other economists have demonstrated that opening 
to foreign investment is associated with a higher 
probability of financial instability.19 
Trade and investment negotiations are often a series 
of trade-offs where a country may relinquish 
measures that in their absence will impair an 
economy in exchange for market access as long 
as the net economic benefits are positive. It is not 
clear that trading away the right to regulate for 
public welfare, and being required to defend such 
regulations in an imbalanced dispute settlement 
system, will yield net economic benefits.  
 
options for Reform
The world economy needs more trade and 
investment to raise the standards of the world’s 
people in a manner that is socially inclusive and 
environmentally sustainable. Trade and investment 
treaties can be useful tools to achieve those goals. 
Unfortunately, at this writing, current and proposed 
treaties harbor investment rules that skew the 
incentive structures of economies away from these 
end goals.  
The text box below lists a series of options for 
reform, categorizing them as reforms that would 
address the concerns with ISDS either (a) in a 
broad-based way at an institutional level or (b) in a 
piecemeal way that leaves important and broader 
concerns outstanding.
This list of reform is not an exhaustive one, but 
coupled with the discussion above it is our hope 
that this short brief will support a more focused 
dialogue on these issues.    As noted earlier, over 
eighty percent of the world economy would be 
governed by these new treaties. It is essential that 
they put in place the right incentives to steer the 
global marketplace toward economic growth that is 
inclusive and sustainable.
Table 1:  ISDS and Public Welfare:  Illustrative Cases
Issue Illustrative Case
Health Care Eli Lilly v. Canada (drug patents)
Philip Morris v. Uruguay (tobacco law)
Financial Reform Abalclat vs Argentine Republic (debt swap)
Saluka v. Czech Republic (too big to fail)
Environmental Protection Chevron v. Ecuador (Amazon pollution)
Renco v. Peru (toxics and mining)
Wages and Equality Veolia v. Egypt (minimum wage)
Piero Foresti v. South Africa  (black empowerment)
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  Reforming Investment Rules
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Broad-based reforms:
1. Exclude ISDS from the treaty.  Countries such as Australia, South Africa, and Ecuador have pursued this 
route.
2. Replace ISDS with a judicial process. 
3. Impose investor responsibilities in addition to granting investor rights, 
Piecemeal reforms: 
i. Procedures
 (1) Require prior exhaustion of local remedies 
 (2) Prohibit arbitrators from acting as advocates in other ISDS cases.
 (3) Deny benefits of ISDS to domestic companies, including foreign subsidiaries that they own or  
  control.
 (4) Exclude lost profits from awards of monetary compensation.
 (5) Provide standing to any affected party (e.g., community next to a mine).
 (6) Provide full transparency of ISDS proceedings, documents and terms of settlement.
 (7) Enforce contractual forum selection clauses
ii.  Substantive rules 
 (1) FET – Require investors to prove a violation of customary international law, based on evidence  
  of state practice and opinio juris.
   -- Alternative: Limit FET to denial of procedural due process in domestic   
   courts and tribunals.
 (2) Expropriation – Limit to direct taking of ownership or control of an asset.
 (3) National treatment – Limit to facially discriminatory measures.
 (4) Most-favored nation treatment – Do not include MFN at all.
 (5) Scope of covered investments – Limit protection to investments that are made in accordance  
  with domestic law.
 (6) Foreign investor responsibilities – Develop actionable rules of due diligence and obligations to  
  comply with domestic law, international human rights, and multilateral environmental  
  agreements.
iii.  Safeguards for protecting the public
 (1) Include a clear and unqualified affirmation of the right to regulate of the state.
 (2) Financial services – 
   (a) Make the prudential language self-judging.
   (b) Include broader financial services exception for measures to protect  
    consumers and communities.
   (c) Ensure that balance of payments safeguards are in place that grant nations  
    the right to regulate the inflow and outflow of capital to prevent and  
    mitigate financial instability
 (3) Public health generally – Carve out health systems and regulatory standards.
 (4) Deference – Establish principles of deference to domestic legislatures and agencies (as exist  
  in domestic law)
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